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TWO FEDERALIST CONSTITUTIONS OF EMPIRE 
Gregory Ablavsky* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, I have written a series of articles and a book on 
the legal history of the United States in the 1780s and 1790s, focusing 
particularly on federal governance.1  This research took me into many 
Federalists’ writings; alongside the works of well-known figures, like George 
Washington and Alexander Hamilton, I read the papers of cabinet officials, 
like Secretaries of War Henry Knox and James McHenry, Secretary of State 
Timothy Pickering, and Secretary of the Treasury Oliver Wolcott, as well as 
more local officials, like Governor Arthur St. Clair and Secretary Winthrop 
Sargent of the Northwest Territory.  These men all identified as Federalists 
in both of the term’s political connotations in the early United States:  all first 
advocated for the newly drafted Constitution during the heated battle for 
ratification and then became partisans of the nascent political party dominant 
in the Washington and John Adams administrations.2 
What united these disparate men’s thought and made them Federalists 
twice over was commitment to federal power.  All of them believed in the 
need for a newly constituted and strengthened federal government, and all 
fought fiercely to establish and defend federal authority.  Why and to what 
end?  What was the new “general,” “national,” or “federal” government, as 
it was interchangeably called at the time, for?  Although my research has 
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 1. See generally GREGORY ABLAVSKY, FEDERAL GROUND:  GOVERNING PROPERTY AND 
VIOLENCE IN THE FIRST U.S. TERRITORIES (2021); Gregory Ablavsky, Administrative 
Constitutionalism and the Northwest Ordinance, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1631 (2019) [hereinafter 
Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism]; Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian 
Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012 (2015); Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States:  The 
Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE L.J. 1792 (2019); Gregory Ablavsky, Species of 
Sovereignty:  Native Nationhood, the United States, and International Law, 1783–1795, 106 
J. AM. HIST. 591 (2019) [hereinafter Ablavsky, Species of Sovereignty]; Gregory Ablavsky, 
The Rise of Federal Title, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 631 (2018); Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage 
Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014) [hereinafter Ablavsky, Savage Constitution]; Gregory 
Ablavsky, “With the Indian Tribes”:  Race, Citizenship, and Original Constitutional 
Meaning, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1025 (2018). 
 2. On these meanings of “Federalist,” see PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:  THE PEOPLE 
DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 92–95 (2010); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF 
LIBERTY:  A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 97–138 (2009).  
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addressed disparate topics in present-day law—property, international law, 
federal Indian law, federalism, and administrative law—this question has 
been at the center of all this work.  I looked for the answer not just in 
ratification and congressional debates but in the practices of everyday 
governance, which persuaded me that scholars have overlooked how much 
federal power was shaped by ad hoc negotiation and politicking.  This work 
also led me to focus on places and areas of law that current constitutional law 
often deems marginal or exceptional:  the U.S. territories, federal lands, and 
relations between the United States and Native nations.  But for late 
eighteenth-century Federalists, these issues were central, arguably even core, 
to the federal government’s purpose. 
One straightforward answer that this research revealed is that the new 
federal government was for empire:  the new United States was an imperial 
state that self-consciously sought to assume many of the responsibilities and 
powers of its British predecessor.3  But empires, as a wealth of recent 
scholarship underscores, are complicated and multifaceted.4  I quickly 
discovered the existence of at least two distinct imperial Federalist 
constitutions, both with roots in prerevolutionary practice and thought. 
Both constitutions embraced expanded federal power but sought to use it 
for divergent ends.  One constitution sought to use federal authority to 
discipline recalcitrant states and U.S. citizens, whose selfish and shortsighted 
behavior, Federalists believed, jeopardized national interests, especially the 
new nation’s relations with other sovereigns.5  The second sought to wield 
the nation’s bolstered financial and military resources against perceived 
external threats and enemies.6  In my earlier work on the role of Indian affairs 
in the creation of the Constitution, I called these two strands Madisonian and 
Hamiltonian, in honor of their principal advocates at the Constitutional 
Convention.7  But both visions swept more broadly than either Indian affairs 
or the immediate context of the Constitution’s creation and beyond these two 
men.  Here, I label them as the “constitution of constraint” and the 
“constitution of empowerment.” 
Like all tidy dichotomies, this approach artificially imposes a sharp divide 
on a muddled past.  Most self-identified Federalists, especially over the 
1790s, embraced both the constitution of constraint and the constitution of 
empowerment.  Many regarded them as importantly intertwined:  many 
Federalists adopted a strikingly militaristic approach because they envisioned 
 
 3. On the United States as an imperial state, see generally BETHEL SALER, THE SETTLERS’ 
EMPIRE:  COLONIALISM AND STATE FORMATION IN AMERICA’S OLD NORTHWEST (2014); 
Gautham Rao, The New Historiography of the Early Federal Government:  Institutions, 
Contexts, and the Imperial State, 77 WM. & MARY Q. 97 (2020). 
 4. For a brief overview of an enormous literature, see generally LAUREN A. BENTON, A 
SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY:  LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400–1900 (2010); 
JANE BURBANK & FREDERICK COOPER, EMPIRES IN WORLD HISTORY:  POWER AND THE POLITICS 
OF DIFFERENCE (2010). 
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. Ablavsky, Savage Constitution, supra note 1, at 1006–07. 
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using a strengthened federal military against both external and internal 
challenges to federal power. 
The value of this dichotomy, to my mind, lies as much in explaining the 
two constitutions’ divergent receptions and fates as it does in illuminating 
Federalist thought.  One key theme in my research, building on a long line of 
scholarship on early American law and politics, is that federal officials, 
whether Federalists or their emerging Republican opponents, could not 
readily control how federal authority was used.8  Rather, people outside the 
federal government routinely seized on Federalist constitutionalism to serve 
their own ends.  In this Essay, I focus on the region I have studied the most, 
the early U.S. territories, which were fractured borderlands where diverse 
groups contested for sovereignty and allegiance.  Residents’ constitutional 
views fell outside the neat partisan categories of Federalist and Republican, 
although both parties sought to shape federal power to accommodate these 
outsiders’ demands.  Native leaders, for instance, actively pressed for the 
constitution of constraint, while white territorial citizens whom Federalists 
labeled the “lawless inhabitants of the frontiers” readily embraced the 
constitution of empowerment.9  In short, like elsewhere in the early United 
States—only perhaps more visibly—the struggle over constitutional meaning 
in the early territories was a fight over access to power and violence. 
We know the end of this story:  as Saul Cornell and Gerry Leonard trace 
in their impressive recent book, Federalist efforts to distance federal power 
from democratic control failed to anticipate the rise of political parties or the 
persistence of popular authority, leading Federalists to retreat to the judiciary 
to fight a partially successful rearguard action.10  In the process, what I have 
dubbed the constitution of constraint largely failed, while the constitution of 
empowerment flourished.  In the territories, this outcome meant that Native 
nations lost, dispossessed by a strengthened federal government placating the 
demands of territorial citizens. 
This outcome might be deemed a form of popular constitutionalism—
except that this framing, rather than a neutral description, vindicates a 
contested constitutional perspective.11  What scholars have labeled popular 
constitutionalism presupposes what territorial citizens demanded:  that there 
was a unified American “people”—implicitly and explicitly coded, as 
Cornell and Leonard point out, as white and male12—and that the role of the 
federal government was to protect their interests.  But the constitution of 
 
 8. See generally ABLAVSKY, supra note 1. 
 9. Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Henry Knox (Apr. 19, 1791), in 1 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS:  INDIAN AFFAIRS 174, 174 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 
Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832). 
 10. GERALD LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC:  DEMOCRACY, 
EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 1780S–1830S, at 84–92 (2019). 
 11. On popular constitutionalism, see generally LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Saul Cornell, The 
People’s Constitution vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution:  Popular Constitutionalism and the 
Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295 (2011). 
 12. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 2–3 (noting how advocates of democracy 
“explicitly excluded all but white men from civic participation”). 
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constraint rested on an alternate vision, embraced by both the Federalists and 
Native leaders, in which the federal government was often obligated to 
sacrifice the demands of its own citizens to abstractions like the “national 
interest” or even “justice.”  Early American politics and law together helped 
doom this approach. 
In one sense, this outcome marked a Federalist failure.  It certainly 
demonstrated shortsightedness, as Federalists failed to anticipate how poorly 
their antidemocratic efforts would fare in a political system in which 
opportunities for popular control and dissent remained rife.  But, as I have 
also stressed in my work, the dominance of the constitution of empowerment 
was also a Federalist triumph of a sort.13  Both during and after ratification, 
Federalists sold the new Constitution for its promise of empowerment and 
then explicitly attempted to curry popular favor in office by deploying federal 
power to placate these demands.  These efforts were often strategic and 
calculating and at times undercut the core aims that Federalists purported to 
endorse—and yet they proved consequential.  In that sense, though 
subsequent constitutional history unfolded in ways that the Federalists did 
not envision and anticipate, it was also a future that they chose. 
I.  CONSTITUTION OF CONSTRAINT 
A.  Creating the Constitution of Constraint 
The key text in the constitution of constraint is perhaps James Madison’s 
well-known “Vices of the Political System of the United States.”14  Over 
multiple pages, Madison decried excesses and failures that had occurred 
under the Articles of Confederation, as he focused on both the failures of the 
state governments and the “people themselves.”15  Madison identified the 
solution as the creation of a strengthened federal government to impose 
checks on both.  As many have noted, he embraced an antidemocratic 
approach of filtration that would place in office “the purest and noblest 
characters.”16  But the core of what I term the “constitution of constraint” 
rests in Madison’s observation:  “The great desideratum in Government is 
such a modification of the Sovereignty as will render it sufficiently neutral 
between the different interests and factions, to control one part of the Society 
from invading the rights of another.”17 
 
 13. See Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 1; Ablavsky, Savage 
Constitution, supra note 1. 
 14. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (1787), reprinted in 
9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON:  CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 345, 348–58 (Robert A. Rutland 
& William M. E. Rachal eds., 1975). 
 15. Id. at 354. 
 16. Id. at 357.  See generally Jack Rakove, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of 
George Washington, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION:  ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 261, 261–65 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987) (reviewing 
the scholarship and summarizing this view). 
 17. Madison, supra note 14, at 357 (footnote omitted). 
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Much constitutional historiography can be read as an exegesis of 
Madison’s “Vices.”  Gordon Wood’s Creation of the American Republic, for 
instance, emphasizes Madison’s fears of the excesses of state legislatures, 
especially their monetary and credit practices, which threatened to trample 
economic stability.18  In this reading, the new federal government would 
check these impulses—ultimately not through the federal veto on state 
actions that Madison sought but instead through the Supremacy Clause as 
well as the limitations that Article I, Section 10 imposed on state actions.19  
Scholars have fought about this transformation’s meaning—debating how 
much Madison’s solicitude for minority rights was at its core a 
counterrevolution to protect wealth from democracy—but they have largely 
agreed on its contours.20 
Other recent work has picked up on another theme prominent in “Vices”:  
the failure of the United States to comply with the strictures of the law of 
nations.21  Deeply concerned about its precarious sovereign status in the 
international community, the new United States sought to win global 
recognition by proving itself a “civilized nation,” in the words of Daniel 
Hulsebosch and David Golove,22 and a “treaty-worthy nation,” in the 
description of Eliga Gould.23  That meant a nation that would keep its word.  
But, Madison lamented, the United States under the Articles was not such a 
nation, as states routinely flouted both the nascent principles of international 
law and the nation’s treaties, especially the Treaty of Paris’s requirement that 
the United States restore confiscated Loyalist property.24  Here, too, the 
remedy lay in the constitution of constraint:  in constitutional provisions that 
expanded federal authority and limited state power over foreign relations, 
including by making treaties supreme federal law and in creating “impartial 
and unbiased” federal courts that would directly enforce treaties and the law 
of nations.25 
 
 18. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 395–
562 (1969). 
 19. ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 132–73 
(2010). 
 20. Compare WOOD, supra note 18, with TERRY BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY:  “THE 
PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, AND THE TROUBLED ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2007), 
and WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (2007), 
and MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP:  THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION (2016). 
 21. For an overview, see generally Max M. Edling, Peace Pact and Nation:  An 
International Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, 240 PAST & PRESENT 267 
(2018). 
 22. See generally David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation:  The 
Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International 
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010). 
 23. ELIGA H. GOULD, AMONG THE POWERS OF THE EARTH:  THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD EMPIRE 12–13 (2012). 
 24. See Madison, supra note 14, at 349. 
 25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., Chicago, Scott, 
Foresman & Co. 1898); see also Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 22, at 989–1015. 
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Although much of this work has followed Madison’s focus on state 
excesses, Madison and others were also concerned about purported popular 
lawlessness.26  Between the lines of “Vices”—and explicitly in much 
Federalist writing—was deep anxiety over Shays’s Rebellion, the populist 
uprising in western Massachusetts against debt collection and state taxes.27  
Massachusetts could barely muster the resources to enforce its laws, leading 
Madison and others to worry about “internal violence” (including Madison’s 
dark acknowledgment of the threat posed by the presence of enslaved African 
peoples).28 
I found that the constitution of constraint also played a key role in 
Federalist thought about the early American west, the vast expanse of land 
between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River that Britain had ceded 
the United States in the Treaty of Peace, even though it was inhabited almost 
exclusively by Native peoples.29  Madison gave some thought to the west; he 
was especially concerned by the defiance and recalcitrance of states in so-
called “Indian affairs” under the Articles of Confederation, when Georgia, 
New York, and North Carolina, all states with vast territorial claims, defied 
federal authority as they asserted questionable title.30  Madison even 
witnessed such confrontations firsthand at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 
1784, in which state and federal officials, in front of Haudenosaunee 
representatives, battled for authority, prompting arrests and counterarrests 
that amounted to a comic opera.31 
But more attention came from Henry Knox, who, as secretary at war under 
the Articles and then secretary of war under the Washington administration, 
was charged with overseeing Indian affairs.  Knox’s proposed remedy to the 
problem of continual violence between Native peoples and Anglo-Americans 
was strikingly Madisonian.  The United States would enter into treaties with 
Native nations creating firm boundaries, which the federal government 
would then police with its military.  “[T]he administration of indian affairs,” 
Knox argued, must be “conducted by fixed principles established by [federal] 
Law, and which being published should be rigidly enforced.”32  The problem, 
according to Knox, was the absence of a neutral arbiter of these conflicts, a 
 
 26. See, e.g., Letter from Virginia Delegates to Benjamin Harrison (Nov. 1, 1783), in 7 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON:  CONGRESSIONAL SERIES, supra note 14, at 391, 392 (decrying 
the “lawless banditti”).  See generally DAVID ANDREW NICHOLS, RED GENTLEMEN & WHITE 
SAVAGES:  INDIANS, FEDERALISTS, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 
57–75 (2008) (describing widespread critiques of perceived lawlessness in the 1780s). 
 27. See generally SEAN CONDON, SHAYS’S REBELLION:  AUTHORITY AND DISTRESS IN 
POST-REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (2015). 
 28. See Madison, supra note 14, at 350–51. 
 29. On Federalist visions for the west, see generally ANDREW R. L. CAYTON, THE 
FRONTIER REPUBLIC:  IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS IN THE OHIO COUNTRY, 1780–1825 (1986); 
KRISTOPHER MAULDEN, THE FEDERALIST FRONTIER:  SETTLER POLITICS IN THE OLD 
NORTHWEST, 1783–1840 (2019); Peter S. Onuf, Liberty, Development, and Union:  Visions of 
the West in the 1780s, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 179 (1986). 
 30. Ablavsky, Savage Constitution, supra note 1, at 1018–33. 
 31. Id. at 1021–22. 
 32. Henry Knox’s Notes on the State of the Frontier, in 5 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON:  PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 76, 79 (Dorothy Twohig et al. eds., 1996). 
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role he believed only the federal government could play:  “[t]here can be 
neither Justice or observance of treaties, where every man claims to be the 
sole Judge in his own cause, and the avenger of his own supposed wrongs,” 
Knox wrote soon after Washington’s inauguration.33  Instead, federal power 
must force both Native peoples and U.S. citizens into obedience:  
“[g]overnment must keep them both in awe by a strong hand,” Knox wrote, 
“and compel them to be moderate and just.”34 
The Constitution and Federalist jurisprudence sought to remedy these 
problems.  “The United States have, under the constitution, the sole 
regulation of Indian affairs, in all matters whatsoever,” Knox insisted, 
pointing to the provisions over treaties, the war power, and commerce, which 
he believed foreclosed all state involvement.35  Knox helped draft the Trade 
and Intercourse Act of 1790,36 a robust assertion of federal power that made 
it a federal crime for citizens to murder or steal from Indians in what it called 
“Indian country” or to attempt to purchase Native land.37  Later versions 
provided for military enforcement, even as Knox fruitlessly sought to create 
courts martial to punish offenses against the treaties.38 
Moreover, to an underappreciated extent, the creation of the federal 
territories itself was part of the constitution of constraint.  Over time, many 
states had, at federal urging, ceded their western land claims to the federal 
government.39  The Constitution specifically blessed sole federal jurisdiction 
and title over these ceded lands through the Property Clause,40 which 
retroactively authorized the Northwest Ordinance, adopted nearly 
simultaneously with the Constitution.41  Later commentators would hail the 
Ordinance as a harbinger of democracy for its promise of admission to 
statehood, guarantees of fundamental rights, and prohibition on slavery, but 
what it created was a strikingly undemocratic form of government that James 
Monroe called “a colonial govt similar to that wh[ich] prevail’d in these 
 
 33. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (July 7, 1789), in 3 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON:  PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 32, at 134, 136. 
 34. Report of the Secretary at War to Congress (July 10, 1787), in 2 THE TERRITORIAL 
PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE TERRITORY NORTHWEST OF THE RIVER OHIO 31, 31 
(Clarence Edward Carter ed., 1934) [hereinafter THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS]. 
 35. Henry Knox, Instructions to General Israel Chapin (Apr. 28, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN 
STATE PAPERS:  INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 231, 232. 
 36. Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (repealed). 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Intercourse Act (Indian Tribes), ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834); Act of Mar. 30, 1802, 
ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139; Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 
Stat. 469; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329. 
 39. See generally PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC:  
JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775–1787 (1983). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 41. Id.  For the original text of the Ordinance, see 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS 334–43 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936).  The Ordinance was reenacted after the 
Constitution’s ratification with minor changes to conform to the new constitutional system. 
See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, §§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 50, 51–53. 
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States previous to the revolution.”42  The law placed sole power over the 
territories with federally appointed officials, while largely depriving 
territorial residents of all rights to vote or meaningful representation, leading 
those who lived under the Ordinance’s strictures to denounce it as “impolitic, 
arbitrary, oppressive and tyrannical.”43  This heavy-handed federal rule, 
observers have noted, exemplified a Federalist vision for the west that sought 
to guard against the supposed lawlessness of white emigrants by placing 
them under firm national control.44 
B.  Explaining the Constitution of Constraint 
Why did Federalists embrace the constitution of constraint?  Federalists 
explained their actions as a vindication of order and a well-regulated 
society—what we would likely now call the rule of law.  For their opponents 
and critics, their efforts reflected an attempt to reverse the egalitarian and 
leveling principles of the American Revolution and reestablish aristocracy in 
place of republicanism.  Both the justifications and the critique reflected 
ideology and class:  a perceived commitment to the “worthy against the 
licentious.”45 
But there were other explanations, too.  Many Federalists, including 
George Washington and Henry Knox, demonstrated deep concern over what 
they called “national character,” reflecting their sense that the new United 
States was under close international scrutiny.46  Knox repeatedly voiced a 
commitment to “justice” for the new nation’s relationship with Native 
peoples, a view heavily shaped by Enlightenment humanitarianism.47  “As 
we are now powerful and more enlightened than [Native peoples] are,” he 
told Washington, “there is a responsibility of national character, that we 
should treat them with kindness and even liberality.”48 
Yet even more, Federalists acted from the realities of early American 
governance and their sense of the national interest.  From the beginning, 
claims and demands besieged the new national government, often with those 
on both sides of political conflicts appealing for federal support and aid.  
Sometimes, as Madison had envisioned, these battles were economic 
struggles among U.S. citizens:  creditors pit against debtors, land speculators 
fighting smallholders, eastern merchant elites dependent on Atlantic 
commerce contesting with farmers as well as westerners reliant on the 
 
 42. Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (May 11, 1786), in 2 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MONROE 298, 298 (Daniel Preston & Marlena C. DeLong eds., 2006).  See generally 
Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 1. 
 43. Vitruvius, Cincinnati, September 27., CENTINEL N.W. TERRITORY, Sept. 27, 1794. 
 44. See supra note 29. 
 45. WOOD, supra note 18, at 475. 
 46. See, e.g., Report of Henry Knox to President George Washington (Dec. 29, 1794), 
microformed on Senate Territorial Papers, Reel 2:  Territory Sw. of the Ohio River (U.S. Nat’l 
Archives). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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Mississippi River drainage.49  Here, Federalists often favored the wealthy 
and well connected, fueling popular anger and resentment against them.50  
But other times, these contests pit what states and most citizens wanted 
against the interests and demands of those outside the political community of 
the United States.  European nations sought to protect their nationals’ 
property against states’ expropriative schemes.51  Native leaders wanted 
something similar, as states purported to legislate away Native property 
altogether, opening up enormous tracts of land for white settlement.52  Here, 
too, Federalists, facing a difficult choice about whose interests to favor, often 
aligned federal power with the outsiders over the United States’ own citizens. 
This decision partly reflected Federalist predilections:  they sought to 
protect property generally, and they often felt more kinship with foreign 
political and diplomatic elites—even Native ones—than their own nation’s 
boisterous citizens.53  But it also stemmed from Federalists’ realistic 
assessment of the balance of power.  European creditors and investors held 
enormous power over the fledgling country and its battered finances; 
Federalists recognized that the success of the United States would depend on 
establishing the nation’s creditworthiness in their eyes.54  Native nations 
possessed considerable power, too.  Throughout much of the 1780s and 
1790s, their diplomatic and military resistance sank federal plans for western 
expansion, destroyed any prospect for land sales, and threatened to engulf the 
United States in enormously expensive conflicts.55  “[A] protracted Indian 
war,” Knox acknowledged in the midst of the fight over ratification, “would 
be destruction to the republic, under its present circumstance.”56  As we shall 
see, that was very nearly also true of the strengthened federal government 
postratification, too.57  Moreover, Native nations on both the northern and 
southern borderlands of the United States retained close alliances with 
Britain and Spain.  At multiple points in the early 1790s, these ties threatened 
to engulf the United States in renewed war not only with Native peoples but 
either or both European empires, which would have proved catastrophic.58 
Little wonder, then, that the entire Washington administration concluded 
that angering its own citizens was preferable to risking relations with 
European or Native sovereigns.  “[T]he U.S. find an Indian war too serious a 
 
 49. See WOOD, supra note 2, at 97–172. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 22, at 961–70. 
 52. See STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND:  LAW AND POWER ON THE 
FRONTIER 150–89 (2005). 
 53. See, e.g., NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 13, 99–125. 
 54. MAX M. EDLING, A HERCULES IN THE CRADLE:  WAR, MONEY, AND THE AMERICAN 
STATE, 1783–1867, at 17–49 (2014); Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 22, at 939–40. 
 55. See generally James H. Merrell, Declarations of Independence:  Indian-White 
Relations in the New Nation, in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:  ITS CHARACTER AND LIMITS 197 
(Jack P. Greene ed., 1987). 
 56. Letter from the Secretary at War to Arthur St. Clair (Dec. 8, 1788), in 2 THE 
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 34, at 166. 
 57. See infra Part II.C. 
 58. See Ablavsky, Species of Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 603–05. 
1686 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
thing, to risk incurring one merely to gratify a few [white] intruders with 
settlements which are to cost the other inhabitants of the U.S. a thousand 
times their value in taxes for carrying on the war they produce,” one cabinet 
member wrote.59  “I am satisfied it will ever be preferred to send armed force 
and make war against the intruders as being more just & less expensive.”60  
These sentiments could have been penned by Knox or Hamilton, but in this 
instance the robust defender of federal military intervention against U.S. 
citizens was Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson.  As Jefferson’s remarks 
underscore, the “Federalist” constitution of constraint was as much a 
recognition of the realities of governance as an endorsement of ideological 
preferences that Jefferson decidedly did not share. 
C.  Enacting the Constitution of Constraint:  The Southwest Territory 
Once in power, Federalists sought to enforce the constitution of constraint 
in multiple ways in multiple venues.  In the realm of foreign relations, the 
Washington administration proclaimed U.S. neutrality in the wars of the 
French Revolution and prosecuted citizens who violated these strictures.61  It 
also negotiated the Pinckney and Jay Treaties, which secured peace and 
stability with Spain and Britain by sacrificing the interests of U.S. citizens, 
or so an extremely heated opposition concluded.62  Domestically, the 
Washington administration sought to enforce federal taxes against the 
populist Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania, marshaling 13,000 
federalized militia against the tax resisters—an enormous force by the 
standards of the day, several times larger than the entire U.S. Army.63  
Several participants were arrested and convicted of treason.64  The Adams 
administration similarly used federal military might to crush the subsequent 
Fries’s Rebellion north of Philadelphia, charging the tax resisters with 
sedition and treason.65 
But I want to focus on the Southwest Territory, one of my topics of 
research.  This region, today the state of Tennessee, lay on the northern edge 
of the Native South, home to the powerful Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, and 
Chickasaw confederacies, which retained close ties with the Spanish in 
Florida and Louisiana.66  North Carolina claimed ostensible jurisdiction until 
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1790, when it ceded its rights to the federal government—but not before 
selling or giving away title to 20 percent of the entire territory to state 
citizens, even though federal law recognized and guaranteed Native title to 
nearly all this land.67  The Creek and Cherokee Nations responded to these 
reckless claims of ownership, as well as the aggressive policies of 
neighboring Georgia, with near-constant raids against encroaching white 
settlements.68 
The Washington administration sought to resolve these tensions through 
authoritative treaties.  In 1790, the United States ratified the Treaty of New 
York with the Creek Nation, the first treaty under the new Constitution.69  
The following year, it signed the Treaty of Holston with the Cherokee.70  The 
administration believed that these treaties, if vigorously enforced, would 
bring peace to the region.71 
These actions reflected Federalist faith in treaty making, but they also 
demonstrated the southeastern nations’ considerable power, especially while 
allied with the neighboring Spanish.  But the region’s Native leaders shared 
the Federalist view that federal power and the constitution of constraint 
offered an alternative to violence.  For years, influential Creek leader 
Alexander McGillivray had battled against what he called the “greedy 
encroachments of the Georgians.”72  En route to meet with the Washington 
administration in New York, McGillivray “spoke freely of the 
contemptableness of the State of Georgia and in exalted terms of the federal 
Government, [and] expressed a great desire to form a lasting treaty.”73  The 
Georgians were outraged by the resulting treaty, but the Federalists ratified 
it over their objections.74 
The neighboring Cherokee Nation felt similarly to the Creek, having faced 
years of encroachments by North Carolinians that Cherokee leaders hoped 
the federal government would halt.  They, too, made treaty concessions “for 
the sake of peace and quietness,” as Cherokee leader Nenetooyah told Henry 
Knox, with the expectation that the federal government would vigorously 
police the resulting boundaries.75  “[I]f your People will not obey you, I wish 
you to write to the President to send regular troops forward to Keep order,” 
Nenetooyah later told the governor of the Southwest Territory, “for I want 
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Peace, that we may travel our paths in Peace and sleep in our Houses and rise 
in peace on both sides.”76 
That a Native leader would appeal for federal soldiers is at odds with our 
image of the dynamics of U.S. colonialism.  But Nenotooyah’s statement 
reflected how Native peoples and Federalists alike found common ground in 
the constitution of constraint:  both sides thought peace possible but only if 
their bargains were rigorously enforced.77 
Yet in practice, both Native and federal leaders struggled to constrain their 
citizens’ actions.  “I was convinced it was not the wish of [federal officials] 
or my self to go to War,” Cherokee leader Kunokeski (also known as John 
Watts) observed, “but was afraid that the Lawless Men living on our lands & 
the frontiers, Would be the occation of all Mischiefs.”78  Because authority 
stemmed more from persuasion than coercion, Cherokee and Creek leaders 
could do little to completely halt raiding parties from the decentralized, loose 
confederacies that constituted the Cherokee and Creek Nations.  Such attacks 
quickly disillusioned territorial citizens about the constitution of constraint.  
“Experience teach[es] us that Treaties answer no other Purpose,” wrote a 
young Southwest Territory resident, “than opening an Easy door for the 
Indians to pass [through to] Butcher our Citizens.”79  Ironically, this 
observer—future president Andrew Jackson—was then serving as the 
region’s U.S. attorney, responsible for indicting any citizens who violated the 
treaties. 
Jackson and nearly all the citizens of the Southwest Territory vociferously 
demanded a federally supported invasion of the Cherokee and Creek nations, 
which, they insisted, was the only way to end violence.  Until the nations 
were “made to feel the horrors of war, they will not know the value of peace, 
nor observe the treaties,” the territorial legislature lectured Congress.80  But 
the Washington administration stubbornly resisted.  “[I]t is very 
questionable, while we are unable, in many cases, to execute our own laws,” 
Knox lectured Georgia’s governor, “whether we ought, in justice, to levy a 
general war upon the Creeks, for the criminality of an individual.”81  After 
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extensive discussion, the entire cabinet concluded that Congress alone had 
the constitutional power to authorize any attacks.82  But a Federalist-
dominated Congress refused to sanction such violence, despite the over-the-
top rhetoric of Southern representatives.83 
For citizens of the Southwest Territory, this refusal was proof that the 
eastern elites that dominated Congress cared nothing about their lives but, on 
the contrary, favored Native peoples:  Congress, one resident complained, 
“are more favourable to their savage, adopted, and illegitimate, than to us 
their legitimate children.”84  On the floor of Congress, a Georgian 
representative proclaimed that federal officials betrayed “improper leanings 
in favor of the Indians” that made his “heart boil.”85  And so white residents 
decided to take matters into their own hands.  The Washington administration 
had authorized territorial officials to call up the militia, unambiguously 
limiting it to defensive purposes only.86  Now, the militia flagrantly defied 
these orders.  In the summer of 1793, they attacked the town of the Cherokee 
leader Scolocutta, who at that very moment, was meeting with federal 
representatives.87  Undeterred, the militia killed eight or nine Cherokee as 
well as one of the white officials.88  The next summer, an even larger militia 
expedition destroyed the Cherokee town of Nickajack in a genocidal assault 
that indiscriminately slaughtered fifty Cherokee men, women, and children 
as they fled to the Tennessee River.89 
These actions understandably disillusioned Cherokees in the constitution 
of constraint.  “Surely you are no head-man nor warrior,” Scolocutta wrote 
to one federal official.90  “I think you are afraid of these bad men . . . .  I think 
they are making fun of you, and won’t listen to your talks.”91  Scolocutta was 
right.  The campaigns outraged the Washington administration:  the president 
denounced such “violent and lawless inroads,” while Henry Knox lectured 
officials that, “[u]nless such crimes shall be punished in an exemplary 
manner, it will be in vain for the government to make further attempts to 
establish any plan or system for the administration of Indian Affairs founded 
on the principles of moderation and justice.”92  Territorial officials tried to 
subject the expeditions’ leaders to the “force of law” but they failed:  the 
expeditions had been widely popular among territorial citizens and so no 
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grand jury would indict the perpetrators.93  Territorial citizens took the pages 
of the Territory’s sole newspaper to insist that the expeditions were 
constitutional.94  They pointed particularly to the provision of Article I, 
Section 10 of the Constitution barring state warmaking unless “actually 
invaded,”95 which they liberally interpreted to mean that “when an enemy 
invades any particular state, such state may engage in war, and Congress is 
bound to support her”—sidestepping the potential objection that the Territory 
was not a state.96 
Federal efforts to restrain the citizens of the Southwest Territory, then, 
seemingly yielded little other than disillusioning Native leaders and white 
citizens alike in the promise of federal power.  When in 1796, the Territory 
joined the Union as the new state of Tennessee, it was, as everyone 
anticipated, staunchly Republican.97  Moreover, as a state, Tennessee was 
even better positioned to thwart Federalist efforts to enforce the constitution 
of constraint within its borders. 
This dynamic was especially clear in the most important and contentious 
issue in the new state’s politics.  In 1797, the federal government at last 
officially surveyed the boundary of the 1791 Treaty of Holston.98  The new 
boundary clarified that an estimated 2500–3000 white Tennesseans claiming 
ownership under North Carolina’s questionable land grants were living on 
Cherokee land—a crime under the federal 1793 Intercourse Act.99  The 
Federalist Adams administration, committed to placating Cherokee demands 
and enforcing the Treaty of Holston, dispatched federal soldiers to evict these 
intruders.100 
White residents were outraged.  Some intruders violently resisted, killing 
several army horses and wounding a federal soldier.101  But the most 
sustained and effective opposition came from state politicians, especially the 
state’s congressional delegation, which included Andrew Jackson, now 
Tennessee’s sole congressman.  The delegation constantly agitated the 
administration on the subject, bombarding it with letters and petitions.102  
The administration had to decide:  would it favor the Cherokees or the state 
of Tennessee?  Ultimately, the choice proved easy:  the Cherokees might be 
upset, but they would likely not risk war over the issue.  Meanwhile, 
Tennessee’s representatives effectively convulsed the federal government.  
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The administration capitulated, and the Senate authorized a new treaty to 
extinguish Cherokee title to the disputed lands at federal expense.103 
For their part, the Cherokee strongly resisted any sale, but they finally 
grudgingly agreed once President Adams made clear that the federal 
government would not continue to defend Cherokee title:  “worthy and well-
intentioned settlers” had appealed to Congress, Adams wrote Cherokee 
leaders, and “the representation of their sufferings induced the Senate of the 
United States to advise a new purchase of land.”104  Cherokee leaders, 
including Nenetooyah, drove a hard bargain and secured a much larger 
compensation than in previous treaties.105  Still, they doubtless wondered 
why only the complaints of the “deserving settlers” carried weight; they, after 
all, had suffered even more heavily at whites’ hands, as they constantly 
reminded federal officials.106  But, as Adams’s letter not so subtly reminded 
them, the Cherokee, unlike whites, were not citizens, nor did they enjoy 
“representation” in Congress.107  In the contest for whose interests the 
administration would favor, the Cherokee would always face a structural 
disadvantage. 
D.  Explaining the Failure of the Constitution of Constraint 
The Federalists were not naïve.  The Constitution’s drafters and 
proponents had recognized that pursuing the national interest—including, at 
times, favoring outsiders over U.S. citizens—would be unpopular and 
politically costly.  As Madison’s “Vices” indicated, they had created the 
Constitution partly to remedy such difficulties, creating a government further 
removed from populist demands in an attempt to allow disinterested 
statesmen to pursue the national interest.108 
Although it has become commonplace to argue that the unexpected rise of 
partisanship doomed such expectations of filtration,109 the Federalist vision 
always misread early American politics.  The Federalists did not anticipate 
how policies they considered in the national interest—like, say, the Sedition 
Act110—would appear to fellow citizens and later observers alike as 
pretextual efforts to use federal authority to preserve power.  But, as Cornell 
and Leonard’s recent book demonstrates, the Federalists also failed to foresee 
how long-standing practices of politics out-of-doors would continue to shape 
federal power.111  Like its predecessor, the Federalists’ renewed imperial 
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state confronted mass mobilization and popular protest.  Remonstrances, 
petitioning, and raucous newspaper and pamphlet wars persisted; so, too, did 
the deeply engrained structures of local governance that federal officials 
futilely attempted to circumvent or diminish, even in places like the 
territories under federal jurisdiction. 
At times, federal authority might prevail against such obstacles, as the 
Whiskey Rebellion demonstrated, but only through raw military force.112  
And perhaps not even then, as events in Tennessee suggested.  In using the 
army to enforce the Treaty of Holston, the Adams administration had acted 
just as the advocates of the constitution of constraint intended:  it sought to 
use enhanced federal powers to pursue what it believed to be the national 
interest, even if that required favoring the outsiders’ interests over U.S. 
citizens’ interests.113  A parochial state elite strongly opposed such measures, 
as Madison feared.  But a national majority did not overcome its objections, 
as he anticipated.  Instead, the rest of the nation proved less disinterested than 
uninterested in what happened in Tennessee, leaving it to those most 
affected—white Tennesseans and Cherokees—to battle for federal support.  
This was always an uneven contest:  white Tennesseans’ vocal and agitated 
representatives were part of the federal government, giving clout that the 
Cherokees could not match.  And so even the sympathetic Adams 
administration decided not to expend the political will to overcome such 
determined opposition. 
Yet, for all the ways that the Federalists appeared out of touch with the 
politics of the nation that they helped create, their constitutionalism was not 
simply a relic of an older, more hierarchical world that newly minted U.S. 
citizens increasingly repudiated.  Rather, the Federalists were arguably the 
victims of their own success.  As the next part explores, their constitution of 
constraint failed in large part because the constitution of empowerment so 
readily eclipsed it. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPOWERMENT 
A.  Constitutional Design 
The other Federalist project, what I have dubbed the constitution of 
empowerment, is also well known in the historiography.  Max Edling in 
particular has drawn attention to how eagerly the Federalists sought to 
construct a fiscal-military state similar to the behemoths constructed in 
eighteenth-century Britain and France.114  Although this aim was a particular 
hobbyhorse of Alexander Hamilton, Edling stresses that it was a goal widely 
shared among other Federalists.115 
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Experience under the Articles had underscored the need for expanded 
resources.  The United States had fought the American Revolution with ad 
hoc institutions and a flurry of debt, but its unexpected victory gave the new 
nation’s leaders remarkable confidence bordering on arrogance:  “[t]he 
Citizens of America,” George Washington wrote at war’s end, were now “the 
sole Lords and Proprietors of a vast tract of Continent.”116  Reality soon 
dashed such grandiose expectations.  This new continental power’s army 
consisted of a miniscule force of a few hundred ill-equipped men, spread 
across isolated outposts along the Ohio River, which Congress could barely 
feed.117  Secretary at War Henry Knox routinely penned reports to Congress 
bewailing the lack of resources to project any federal power.118 
The drafters of the new constitution sought to remedy what one 
congressional committee had called the “imbecility of the federal 
government.”119  The document created a robust financial system of taxation 
and authorized the creation of a national military, while granting the federal 
government the sole power to declare war.120  Importantly, it also empowered 
the federal government to federalize the most substantial military force in the 
early United States, the state militias.121 
The creation of a fiscal-military state was a quintessentially Federalist 
project in both senses of the term.  As Edling traces, the Constitution’s 
proponents constantly invoked the need for expanded fiscal-military powers 
to justify the new government.122  At the same time, the document’s 
opponents constantly railed against the prospect of a standing army and 
national debt, which smacked too much of the European statecraft they 
thought the Revolution had supposedly been fought to reject.123  After 
ratification, this divide quickly reappeared, separating members of the 
Washington administration more bullish on the fiscal-military state, 
especially Hamilton and Knox, from its critics, particularly Jefferson, around 
whom the nascent Republican opposition coalesced. 
B.  Explaining the Constitution of Empowerment 
Why did the Federalists embrace the constitution of empowerment?  In 
part, for many Federalists drawing from European models, the fiscal-military 
state represented what governments did:  they built the institutional means to 
project power.  For Hamilton and others, a strengthened financial system was 
also an important aspect of nation building.  The national debt would tie local 
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financial and economic elites to the new national government, recreating the 
chains of patronage that glued European empires together, while federal 
finance would promote internal and foreign commerce.124 
As for the strengthened military, as we have seen, it was closely tied to the 
constitution of constraint—a way to discipline an often recalcitrant 
citizenry.125  Strikingly, many of the Federalists were Continental Army 
veterans, and so embraced a militaristic vision of how law and order worked.  
This was especially true of Henry Knox, who saw a national military as the 
sole foundation for peace on the borderlands.  “The angry passions of the 
frontier Indians and whites,” he wrote, “are too violent to be controuled by 
the feeble authority of the civil power.”126  He continued, “In such a case the 
sword of the Republic only, is adequate to guard a due administration of 
Justice, and the preservation of the peace.”127 
Yet the Federalists also embraced the constitution of empowerment as a 
way to sell a controversial new government.  During the hard-fought political 
campaign for ratification, Federalists rarely talked about marching federal 
soldiers against the nation’s own citizens.  Instead, they constantly and 
frequently invoked external threats:  the British in Canada, the Spanish in 
Florida and Louisiana, and what Hamilton called, in Federalist No. 24, the 
“savage tribes on our Western frontier.”128  Indeed, the constant parade of 
hostile Europeans and vengeful Native peoples, and the insistence that only 
the federal government could prevent the challenge, became something of a 
Federalist trope during ratification.129 
Much of this rhetoric was expedient.  Unlike Washington, Jefferson, or 
Knox, Hamilton gave little thought or consideration to Native peoples, and, 
to the extent he did, he shared the Washington administration’s embrace of 
treaties and federal law as the basis for peace.130  But Hamilton and other 
Federalists recognized that the Indian threat had been routinely and 
effectively deployed to justify governmental authority for over a half century.  
Such ritualized invocation of white suffering at Native hands—what 
historian Peter Silver has called the “anti-Indian sublime”—had proved 
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especially important for national unity during the Revolution.131  And so 
many Federalists readily adopted this rhetorical tact—a position at odds with 
their preferred policies—to sell their new Constitution’s most controversial 
features.132  But they would discover, after ratification, that these political 
concessions had consequences, as many newly minted U.S. citizens took the 
Federalists at their word on the new government’s function. 
C.  Constitution of Empowerment in Action:  The Northwest Territory 
As Daniel Hulsebosch has underscored, the new federal government that 
the Washington administration built proved less a fiscal-military state than a 
“fiscal-commercial” one.133  Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton 
soon constructed a system of national finance and a funded national debt to 
expand the federal government’s fiscal resources.134  By contrast, although 
Secretary of War Henry Knox sought to create a professional and disciplined 
national military, his efforts to expand national oversight over the militia and 
to bolster the nascent professional army were halting and controversial.135 
Yet the fledgling federal government’s first substantial challenge 
nonetheless tested its fiscal-military capacity.  “The Indian war,” as Anglo-
Americans of the time simply called it (scholars have subsequently labeled it 
the Northwest Indian War) was fought almost entirely within the newly 
created Northwest Territory.136  This purported federal jurisdiction was a 
homeland for the Wyandots, Miamis, Delawares, Shawnees, Anishinaabeg, 
and other nations who confederated to combat U.S. encroachments.137  With 
British support, this Native confederacy insisted on the Ohio River as the 
boundary between Native and U.S. territory; the federal government, which 
claimed to have already purchased much Native land beyond this line, 
resisted.138  Ultimately, federal military might prevailed.  At the ensuing 
Treaty of Greenville, federal negotiators forced the defeated Native nations 
to cede the United States most of present-day Ohio.139 
This capsule summary is as much attention as the conflict receives in most 
histories of the 1790s—largely because the conflict and its outcome feel so 
familiar.  In hindsight, the Northwest Indian War appears part of an unbroken 
history of violence against Native peoples that stretched backward to contact 
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and lasted for most of the nineteenth century.  These conflicts unfolded 
similarly:  Anglo-Americans arrogated sovereignty and ownership over 
North America to themselves and, ultimately—through overwhelming force 
and raw, sometimes genocidal, violence—the federal government crushed 
Native peoples’ armed resistance to these claims.140  As with subsequent 
conflicts, it was not clear that Anglo-Americans considered the Northwest 
Indian War a “war” in a legal or constitutional sense; Congress never 
declared war but merely authorized the president to federalize the state 
militia.141 
But reading the Northwest Indian War as simply the first instance when 
the U.S. Army violently suppressed Native resistance against U.S. 
imperialism ignores how seriously the conflict challenged the nascent federal 
government.  Unlike later Indian wars, the United States nearly lost, with two 
federal expeditions suffering catastrophic defeats.  The second expedition, in 
fall 1791, lost two-thirds of its men at the hands of the Northwest 
Confederacy; this unnamed battle remains the worst defeat that the United 
States ever suffered at Native hands.142  The new U.S. Army seemed 
incapable of maintaining discipline or supplying its own troops, even as the 
conflict led British officials to talk openly about an imminent renewed war 
with the United States.143  Ultimately, the federal government prevailed—
but only after it spent four years, and over half of the new nation’s budget, to 
equip and dispatch a far better trained and equipped fighting force that eked 
out an ambiguous victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers.144  Even then, 
historians have argued that U.S. success was owed more to diplomatic than 
military victories, as the United States persuaded the British to abandon their 
Native allies, forcing Native nations to the bargaining table.145 
The Northwest Indian War, then, was the most significant early test of the 
Federalist state and one that the new nation nearly failed.  It was also, 
relatedly, markedly controversial among Anglo-Americans.146  But the war’s 
politics did not map neatly onto the nascent Republican-Federalist divide, 
instead revealing a more complicated history of who in the early United 
States embraced the fiscal-military state and why. 
Partisanship certainly shaped many responses to the war.  Many 
Jeffersonians, for instance, thought the war an unnecessary and pretextual 
effort to justify an expanded military.  Jefferson himself weakly supported 
the conflict but thought that more assiduous efforts at peace would have been 
salutary.  “Every rag of an Indian depredation will otherwise serve as a 
ground to raise troops with those who think a standing army and a public debt 
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necessary for the happiness of the U.S.,” he observed, “and we shall never be 
permitted to get rid of either.”147  Others were similarly skeptical of Knox’s 
motives.  “I have a great respect for the War officer,” one proto-Republican 
senator wrote Washington, “but he appears to me to be anxiously desirous of 
having a considerable standing military force, all his views in my estimation 
tend to that end.”148 
Yet Knox was no warmonger.  In his lengthy reports to Washington, the 
secretary of war had repeatedly advocated peace with Native nations:  “[t]he 
United States can get nothing by an Indian war,” he wrote, “but they risque 
men, money and reputation.”149  Yet for Knox, peace would come only by 
robustly applying the constitution of constraint against “lawless” whites and 
Native peoples alike.  The Northwest Indian War began when Knox 
authorized a targeted expedition to “extirpate, utterly . . . banditti” Indians, 
one that would function similarly to the later expeditions against the Whiskey 
rebels.150  “[T]he vengeance of the Union is to be pointed only against the 
perpetrators of the mischief,” Knox stressed, “and not against the friendly 
nor even neutral tribes.”151 
Confident in the purity of his intentions, Knox badly miscalculated.  Since 
the birth of the United States, Native peoples in the Ohio country had 
suspected that the new nation intended to exterminate them and take their 
lands.152  They were not wrong.  Many Anglo-Americans sought to do just 
that, as events like the 1782 Gnadenhutten Massacre—in which the 
Pennsylvania militia cold-bloodedly killed nearly one hundred pacifist 
Delawares—demonstrated.153  The federal invasion seemingly confirmed 
Native peoples’ fears that the United States’ talk of peace was mere trickery; 
here, it seemed, was proof of the nation’s true intent.  As a result, Knox’s 
targeted expedition quickly brought about the full-blown war that the 
secretary sought so desperately to avoid. 
Once the initial expedition ended in disaster for the U.S. Army, however, 
the need to prove federal power became its own justification.  Believing that 
establishing the new nation’s overwhelming force was the only way to secure 
lasting peace, Knox immediately began planning another, larger assault.  
“The great object of the campaign will be, to convince the indians of the 
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futility of resistance,” he told President Washington, “and of the absolute 
necessity of submitting to the justice and mercy of the United States.”154  
When that campaign failed even more spectacularly, Knox became even 
more resolute, advocating increasing the army to over 5000 regular 
soldiers—a number Congress found wildly inflated.155 
The Northwest Indian War was deeply uncomfortable for Knox and other 
Federalists, as they defended a conflict flatly at odds with their professed 
aims.  Many of their constituents recognized, and resented, this contradiction.  
“I was a little surprized to find that the Indian War is extremely unpopular in 
New England,” Washington’s personal secretary reported from the nation’s 
most Federalist region.156  “I have not heard it mentioned by a single person 
who did not consider it as arising rather from a wish on the part of the United 
States to obtain lands to which they have no just claim”—the exact opposite 
principle from what Knox sought to establish as the foundation for the 
nation’s policy toward Native nations.157 
Pressured, Knox and Washington publicly issued a statement to justify the 
conflict.158  This was a revealing document.  In it, they described the federal 
government’s assiduous efforts to maintain peace, but they also offered a 
parade of the perfidious acts of Native peoples, recounting the “barbarous 
warfare practised by the Indians”159 and ritually invoking “the tomahawk and 
scalping-knife.”160  And they vindicated the war by appealing to the federal 
government’s purpose.  “To obtain protection against lawless violence, was 
a main object for which the present government was instituted.  It is, indeed, 
a main object of all government,” they recited.161  “[T]he obligation of the 
government of the United States, to afford the requisite protection, cannot be 
less sacred in reference to the inhabitants of their Western, than to those of 
their Atlantic Frontier.”162 
What is striking about this statement is how sharply it conflicted with the 
personal views of both Knox and Washington, who both privately bemoaned 
invocations of the anti-Indian sublime.163  Moreover, the document’s vision 
of the federal role cast aside the constitution of constraint that the two men 
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had long advocated for in favor of what we might call frontier 
constitutionalism—the constitutional views espoused by the white residents 
of Kentucky, the Northwest Territory, western Pennsylvania, and the new 
nation’s other borderlands. 
Like the citizens of the Southwest Territory, white inhabitants of the 
Northwest Territory had little patience for the constitution of constraint and 
readily condemned any government official who opposed their calls for 
violence.  “[W]hoever should attempt to preserve Peace with Indians was 
instantly denounced as an Indian Friend,” Governor Blount reported from the 
Southwest Territory, “and the Cry accordingly raised against him.”164  In the 
Northwest Territory, residents reportedly plotted to assassinate their arch-
Federalist governor for his pro-Native views.165  In both territories, angry 
constitutional arguments filled the newspapers, with authors cribbing 
revolutionary complaints to argue for local autonomy against supposedly 
heavy-handed federal rule.166 
Yet territorial citizens were not Jeffersonians.  They, unlike Jefferson, 
were eager advocates of a federal fiscal-military state—so long as it acted in 
their interests.167  Knox’s assertions about western citizens’ entitlement to 
federal protection could have been lifted from the territorial newspapers, 
which routinely invoked this constitutional claim to demand federal aid.168  
Moreover, the borderlands’ economy benefited enormously from the federal 
invasion.  Nearly overnight, the war turned Cincinnati into a boomtown, 
while Kentucky, one observer noted, was “more full of Money arising 
from . . . the army North of Ohio than any other Part of America.”169 
The similarity between the administration’s pronouncement on the war’s 
causes and frontier constitutionalism was not accidental, as the 
administration deliberately adopted borderlands legal rhetoric to placate 
restive territorial citizens.  Federal military force was the method most likely 
“to attach the people of the frontiers to the government of the United States,” 
Knox stated in justifying the expedition into Indian country.170  Later, in 
further selling the campaign, Knox noted that it was a “circumstance of no 
small importance, that the desultory operations will be highly acceptable to 
the Kentucky district, and other frontier counties.”171  Knox’s comments 
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found echoes among other Federalists, who similarly saw the conflict as a 
chance to demonstrate their commitment to frontier citizens:  “Congress has 
little occasion to make itself known to them except by acts of protection,” 
one Massachusetts Federalist wrote.172 
This evidence suggests two points.  First, the Northwest Indian War 
underscored how little Federalists controlled the meaning of federal power 
in the early United States.  The war was as much a Federalist project as their 
effort to secure peace through restraining U.S. citizens was; in fact, Knox 
saw them as interrelated projects.  But the war’s course and implications were 
largely determined by those outside the administration.  Despite Knox’s 
intentions, Native nations in the Ohio country reasonably interpreted the U.S. 
invasion of their homelands not as a targeted attack on “renegade” Native 
peoples but as proof that the administration’s rhetoric of peace masked its 
true intent to fulfill whites’ long-standing aspirations to extirpate Native 
peoples.173  Similarly, territorial citizens took the conflict as vindication of 
their vituperative anti-Indian rhetoric.  They had successfully argued that 
their right of protection mandated federally supported violence against their 
supposed enemies. 
Yet, and second, the forces of popular constitutionalism did not simply 
overpower the supposedly antipopulist Federalists.  Rather, saddled with an 
expensive and controversial war, the Washington administration calculatedly 
adopted the principles and rhetoric of the frontier constitutionalism it 
purported to despise.  As this reversal demonstrated, the Federalists not only 
failed to anticipate how poorly filtration would function, but they also had 
not guessed how quickly they too would succumb to the power of politics to 
shape constitutional meaning.  Just as during ratification, Federalists’ 
eagerness to placate some of their citizens helped make a supposedly 
impartial federal government into an instrument of brutal violence against 
Native peoples. 
D.  Explaining the Flourishing of the Constitution of Empowerment 
In 1807, shortly after much of the Northwest Territory became the state of 
Ohio, Joseph Buell wrote to an unknown correspondent on “business of 
trifling consequence.”174  Buell wanted to know what to do with a small 
cannon provided by the federal government “in the time of the Indian war” 
during “our former stage of government.”175  The gun’s “principal use” now, 
he reported, was the “discharging of it on the 4th of July, Reechoing the toasts 
drank in contempt to the Gen[era]l Government.”176 
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Viewed from the present, Buell’s letter presents a familiar contradiction:  
the beneficiaries of federal largesse spurning the very government that aided 
them.  Certainly, if the Federalists hoped to win the appreciation and support 
of the region’s inhabitants by lavishing them with federal support, they failed.  
Soon after the war’s end, citizens in the Northwest Territory expressed their 
“acknowledgments and gratitude” that the federal government had 
“expended the whole revenue of the union for several years, in order to afford 
us ample protection”—right before launching into a litany of complaints and 
attacks on federal policy.177  In the end, the new state of Ohio, formed from 
the former territory, became just as staunchly Republican as Tennessee, with 
most residents eagerly supporting President Jefferson’s policies.178 
Yet Buell’s letter exemplifies less a paradox than a long-standing fight 
over the purpose of the federal government.  Having created a newly 
empowered national government, Federalists discovered that they could not 
easily control how this strengthened state was deployed.  Citizens long 
resented federal efforts to constrain them but eagerly seized the fiscal-
military state to serve their own ends.  For their part, the Jeffersonians, now 
elevated to power, did little to alter the militaristic approach they had earlier 
condemned.179  Both during the military campaigns of William Henry 
Harrison against a renewed Native confederacy under Tecumseh and then 
during the wider conflict of the War of 1812, Jefferson and his copartisans 
deployed federal fiscal and military resources toward U.S. expansion just as 
the Federalists had done.180  And just as with the Federalists, this outcome 
reflected less hypocrisy than politics:  though Jefferson was still personally 
ambivalent about the federal state and westward expansion, many in the 
Republican coalition, especially in the West, readily pushed the constitution 
of empowerment.  In the end, the Republicans proved no more consistent, or 
adept, at controlling the constitution’s meaning than their predecessors.  And 
once again, the consequence was that federal power was wielded largely in 
one direction—against Native peoples who had their own views on the role 
of the federal government but who were nonetheless excluded from the realm 
of constitutional politics. 
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CONCLUSION 
The conventional story of the Federalist Constitution is one of retreat:  
after a brief reign, the Federalists largely lost power as Republicans captured 
the presidency and Congress.  Yet their influence endured, this story runs, in 
the judiciary, as judges like James Kent, Joseph Story, and especially Chief 
Justice John Marshall checked states’ efforts to interfere with national 
authority, enshrined the law of nations, and protected so-called “vested 
rights” to property.181 
Yet even as Marshall embraced the constitution of constraint, he proved 
an equally robust defender of the constitution of empowerment—sometimes 
at the same time.  The 1810 case of Fletcher v. Peck,182 for instance, is hailed 
as the origin of Marshall’s Contract Clause183 jurisprudence, as the Chief 
Justice held that Georgia’s legislature could not invalidate an earlier 1795 
sale of millions of acres of western territory to land companies.184  Yet at the 
same time, Marshall endorsed, in a sentence, Georgia’s right to sell the land 
even while federal treaties guaranteed Native ownership.185  Marshall’s aside 
disregarded a decade of legal contentions in which the Washington 
administration and others had repeatedly insisted that Georgia had no legal 
or constitutional right to sell land it did not own.186 
Fletcher prefigured Johnson v. M’Intosh,187 Marshall’s 1823 decision that 
defined Native title as a mere right of occupancy.188  Johnson is a strikingly 
complex decision in which Marshall at once advanced standard Anglo-
American attacks on Native ownership even as he distanced himself from 
them.189  Yet, under the constitution of constraint, Johnson was a pretty easy 
case:  both British and federal law barred individuals from purchasing Native 
title.190  Rather than simply invoking positive law, though, Marshall penned 
a much more expansive decision that endorsed Anglo-Americans’ rights to 
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own, buy, and sell title to Native lands even before Native peoples had ceded 
any rights.191 
As a result, Johnson quickly became a key text in the constitution of 
empowerment.  Kent cited to the case in his influential Commentaries on 
American Law to describe Native peoples as “separate, subordinate, and 
dependent.”192  Johnson also emboldened states.  In the late 1820s and 1830s, 
as Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and other states began to aggressively 
assert a long-standing claim that they had absolute jurisdiction over their 
entire territories, they routinely invoked Marshall’s decision to vindicate 
their rights.  When the Cherokee Nation and its allies responded that federal 
law recognized their sovereignty and invalidated the states’ actions—
invoking, in short, the constitution of constraint, just as earlier Cherokee 
leaders had done—Southerners replied that Johnson was “the death blow to 
this new doctrine of Indian sovereignty.”193 
In the end, Marshall disagreed with this interpretation.  In Worcester v. 
Georgia,194 the Chief Justice endorsed a vision of federal supremacy over 
Indian affairs that foreclosed Georgia’s assertion of jurisdiction, an embrace 
of the constitution of constraint that might have been cribbed from Henry 
Knox.  But Marshall’s belated change of heart could not erase the principles 
he had earlier established.  Two years after Worcester, Chief Justice John 
Catron of the Tennessee Supreme Court (soon to be a Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court) defied the Court’s decision and upheld state jurisdiction over 
the Cherokee.195  Catron cited Marshall against Marshall:  “In this conclusion 
we are fortified by the great and well considered case of Johnson against 
M’Intosh; the reasoning in which, by the same distinguished jurist, it must 
be admitted, if not in direct opposition, is greatly in conflict with Worcester’s 
case.”196 
Worcester famously prompted a confrontation between Marshall and 
Tennessee’s first congressman:  now president Andrew Jackson.  If Marshall 
was a latter-day defender of Federalist constitutionalism, Jackson appears as 
its antithesis, a populist whose impatience with law’s restraints was sharply 
at odds with what Washington, Hamilton, and Knox had envisioned for the 
new republic.197 
The young Jackson had certainly been no fan of the Federalists and had 
had particular contempt for the constitution of constraint.  He mocked Knox 
and others who thought that “humanity dictates” the pursuit of peace through 
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treaties.198  Congress “ought to Extend an Equal share of humanity to her 
own Citizens,” Jackson fulminated, by “Punish[ing] the Barbarians for 
Murdering her Innocent Citizens.”199  Reportedly, Jackson acted on this 
belief by serving as a private in James Ore’s brutal destruction of the 
Cherokee town of Nickajack.200 
Yet Jackson and his ideology were less a repudiation of Federalist 
constitutionalism than a fulfilment of some of its key legacies.  Like the 
Federalists, Jackson, too, drew his legal understandings from the Constitution 
and Emer de Vattel’s The Law of Nations; he just consistently read them in a 
single direction, to authorize and vindicate his uses of power rather than 
restrain them.201  Similarly, for all his vaunted hostility toward the Federalist 
financial machinery, Jackson proved remarkably adept at exploiting the 
federal government’s expansive fiscal-military powers to rampage through 
the borderlands.  From Ore’s expedition through the slaughter of the Creek 
Nation during the War of 1812 and the invasion of Spanish Florida during 
the First Seminole War, Jackson deployed federal authority, federal soldiers, 
federalized militias, and federal finance toward his own ends, defying the 
limits his superiors sought to impose.202 
The process euphemistically called “Indian Removal” that followed 
Marshall’s abortive Worcester decision was thus the capstone to Jackson’s 
exploitation of federal power.  This brutal and incompetently executed mass 
expulsion of Native peoples from their homelands came at states’ behest, but 
federal authority underwrote and enacted it.203  Ultimately, the “Indian 
Removal” cost the federal government $75 million, a sum historian Claudio 
Saunt calculates as the equivalent of a trillion dollars in the present.204  He 
estimates that, in peak years, 40 percent of every federal dollar went to fund 
the deportation.205 
Over the past few years, historians have hotly debated how straight a line 
to draw between the policies adopted at the moment of the Constitution’s 
creation and the brutal, even genocidal, practices against Indigenous peoples 
that came to characterize Anglo-American imperialism.206  Lawyers have 
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slowly begun to enter this argument, too.207  In this debate, historians’ long-
standing depictions of the Federalists as well-intentioned but ineffectual 
policymakers, unable to thwart the Indian-hating whites of the borderlands, 
appears at best unpersuasive and at worse an “effacement of U.S. settler 
colonialism.”208 
Part of the difficulty of this debate is that it seeks to identify a single core 
to Federalist views.  But no such core existed, as the Federalists, like others 
in the early republic, embraced divergent positions.  On the one hand, the 
Federalists did not represent an egalitarian, anti-racist path not taken:  their 
views on Native peoples were condescending, thoroughly imperialist, and at 
times exterminatory.  On the other hand, their limited embrace of “Indian 
rights” and autonomy was more than a mere sop to Native power; they 
sincerely believed in these commitments.  In this sense, their seemingly 
contradictory efforts to guard Cherokee land while also forcibly seizing 
Wyandot territory were both Federalist policies. 
Also missing from this debate is politics.  Whether valorized or 
condemned, fixating on the Federalists and their views maintains them as the 
key actors.  In practice, though, more clout lay with Native leaders and 
borderlands citizens, who made competing demands on the federal 
government.  Navigating between these claims, Knox, Washington, and other 
Federalists sought, often fruitlessly, to placate both groups.  The result was 
that the federal government simultaneously embraced robust 
acknowledgment of Native sovereignty and exterminatory anti-Indian 
violence.  These vacillations between the two strands of Federalist 
constitutionalism underscore that, in the end, the Federalists were politicians, 
if not particularly good ones. 
This history suggests a broader point about the political and constitutional 
history of the early republic.  Usually, this period’s politics are narrated as a 
struggle over the scope of federal power:  Federalist (and later Whig) 
nationalists pit against Republican (and later Democratic) defenders of 
states’ rights and strict construction.209  This account depicts the parties’ 
frequent breaks from this ideological script—Jefferson reluctantly endorsing 
the Louisiana Purchase or the Federalists plotting secession at Hartford—as 
hypocrisies and ironic concessions to power. 
But the meaning of federal authority in the early republic was not as 
coherent or clear as this narrative posits.  The enumeration in Article I, 
Section 8 notwithstanding, the federal government was not for any particular 
purpose.  Rather, it was at once a tool, a resource, and a battleground for 
competing views.  As the two Federalist constitutional visions traced here 
demonstrate, the Federalists were themselves inconsistent on federal power’s 
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uses.  These contradictions made space for those with their own 
interpretations of the federal role, including Natives and territorial citizens, 
who seized on different parts of the Federalist project for their own ends.  In 
the end, Native perspectives on the Constitution largely lost, while whites’ 
frontier constitutionalism prevailed.  But this outcome reflected more than 
Federalist betrayal.  It was the overdetermined outcome of a system that 
placed Native peoples on the outside, limiting their very real power to the 
military and diplomatic realms, even as their opponents manipulated the 
clout that politics out-of-doors and popular constitutionalism afforded them. 
